Japan's quest to amend pacifist constitution

By Imran Khalid

Two events within the span of just three days have suddenly refueled a heated debate about the possibility of amendments in the pacifist constitution of Japan in the coming days.

On July 8, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was assassinated, and on July 10 in parliamentary elections for the upper house, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its junior partner Komeito won 70 out of 125 seats up for grabs ― raising their combined share in the 248-seat chamber to 146 ― far beyond a simple majority.

Both these events have certainly given new impetus to the decade-old campaign initiated by Abe to transform the structure of the pacifist constitution that has been in place since 1947.

After World War II, the pacifist constitution was promulgated that renounces Japan's ability to wage war and forbids it from maintaining "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential."

This pacifism was further reinforced by the Yoshida doctrine, initiated by Japan's first postwar Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, which strongly influenced subsequent generations of Japanese political leadership to focus on economic development, refrain from militarizing and adhere to the pacifist constitution.

Abe was the first Japanese prime minister to openly start talking about amending the pacifist constitution, taking a bold step in 2016 by implementing a new security law to lift the ban on the "right of collective self-defense" and breaking the restrictions on sending troops overseas which had been in place since 1945 ― ostensibly bypassing the core theme of the country's pacifist constitution.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a major event that actually jolted the entire spectrum of Japanese society in general. For obvious reasons, the Ukraine invasion provided the much-needed pretext to the right-wing politicians and Abe to rekindle the topic of constitutional amendments to make it "at par" with the changing ground realities.

For a very long time, Abe had been talking about the "China threat" as the key element to realign Japanese foreign policy.

In order to counter Chinese expansionism in the East and South China Sea as well as Indo-Pacific ― his favorite term to describe the long strategic stretch from East China to the Indian Ocean ― Abe pushed hard to engage Japan with many regional and sub-regional security "projects" and dialogues. And, at the same time, he also kept on canvassing at home for the modifications to the pacifist constitution.

But, factually speaking, despite all his intense efforts, Abe was never hopeful about achieving this main plank of his doctrine in the near future. One key factor that kept the pacifist constitution intact since 1947 without any amendment is the complicated procedure itself. To do so, more than two-thirds of lawmakers in both the upper house and the House of Representatives must vote in favor of the proposed amendments, which then need approval from a majority of voters in a national referendum.

The fact is that the perpetually divided Japanese Diet never allowed any government to think about any kind of changes in the constitution because of this very reason.

But, for the very first time since 1947, after the results of the July 10 elections, the pro-constitutional amendment camp, comprising the LDP-Komeito coalition, plus two opposition parties and independents, suddenly finds itself well within the range to make it a reality after crossing the 166-seat threshold in the upper chamber.

This bloc already has secured support in the other chamber. Perhaps this numerical possibility has encouraged the right-wingers in Japan to rekindle this topic with much more intensity ― particularly against the backdrop of a very high wave of public sympathy after the unfortunate assassination of Abe.

There is no doubt that this "remilitarization" ambition of the Japanese right-wing forces has been rekindled following the LDP's electoral success. The principles of evolution of global power equation also suggest that Japan will eventually be remilitarized, but the momentum and extent of this process depends upon five major factors.

The first is related to the political outlook of Prime Minister Kishida himself. Unlike Abe and current LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, Kishida is not hawkish in his approach. It is also true that Kishida, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, seriously rebutted Abe's advocacy for Japan hosting U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent as "unacceptable" while referring to the country's stance of maintaining three principals of non-proliferation.

Kishida's commitment to the Abe doctrine is serious, but he is not expected to be as eager as Abe. The second problem is that a big chunk of the LDP's core team is also not convinced of the idea to make any radical changes in the constitution in one go.

The third challenge is from the other side of the political divide that has already started its symbolic protest demonstrations inside the Diet building to preempt such a move from the right-wing camp.

The fourth factor is public opinion, which is still clearly tilted in favor of keeping the existing constitution intact, and the opposition parties can build an anti-amendment momentum to disrupt the smooth working of the Kishida regime.

And a fifth ― but external ― factor would be the response of Washington on this matter in the long run. At the moment, the U.S.is readily supporting the concept of a "remilitarized" Japan with a view to counterbalance China's growing activity in the region.

By extending NATO membership to a militarized Japan, some hawkish quarters in NATO are eager to create an "Asian NATO" or a "Global NATO" to contain Russia and China from all sides. But a militarized Japan may prove to be a contrariwise choice for the U.S. in the long run.

Currently, under its exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan spends 1 percent of GDP; even so, it is the seventh-largest military spending in the world. Similarly, the Global Firepower Index (GPI) ranked Japan fifth globally in overall military power.

If the constitution is modified and remilitarization is allowed, Japan has all the potential to turn into a formidable force with a tendency to break away from the influence of Washington to assert its own stature on the global power structure. This would certainly be a dreadful scenario for the U.S.

So, the remilitarization of Japan is fraught with many hazards that can actually shake the global power equation altogether and even create a new "threat" for Washington. Sooner or later, the remilitarization of Japan will happen, but its speed and extent will be decided by these factors.

Dr. Imran Khalid (immhza6@gmail.com) is a freelance contributor based in Karachi, Pakistan. The views expressed in the above article are the author's own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.