Six months into Ukraine war, will Western unity hold?

By Andrew Hammond

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, one of the genuine geopolitical surprises to many has been the stronger-than-expected unity the West has shown against Moscow.

Some seven economic sanctions packages have already been announced by the EU alone, yet with this week marking the six-month anniversary of the conflict, greater cracks are showing.

It is Hungary, of course, which has been the most outspoken outlier so far. Yet behind wider European public statements of support for Ukraine, there are significant differences of opinion, including between key Western European states such as Germany and France, versus nations on the East of the continent which want to see an even tougher response such as the Nordics, Baltics, and Poland.

The schisms within Europe were showcased in June in a European Council on Foreign Relations poll which showed that, while Europeans feel significant solidarity with Ukraine and support sanctions, they are split about longer-term goals. They remain divided between a "Peace" camp (35 percent and potentially growing) that wants the war to end speedily, and a "Justice" camp that believes the more pressing goal is to punish Russia (22 percent).

In all countries, apart from Poland, the "Peace" camp is larger than the "Justice" equivalent. And European citizens worry, increasingly, about the cost of sanctions and the threat of military escalation.

For now, these European differences have been camouflaged quite successfully by the Brussels-based club. However, this may be much harder as the economic and political pain bites harder from the Ukraine crisis.

Changes of leadership could also make a difference too. Italy which under Prime Minister Mario Draghi was a strong supporter of Kyiv, could become significantly less so if the nation's right-wing bloc, within which there is significant sympathy toward Russia, wins power next months.

In this context, where European unity will probably become harder as time goes by, a significant uncertainty remains on how much longer the war will last. Six months in, this is highly uncertain, but there are some clues of the next steps.

In the coming weeks, it is unlikely either side will win a decisive victory imminently. That is, for as long as Moscow is prepared to expend huge resources in the conflict, while Ukraine continues to be supplied extensively by the West.

The most likely scenario in the coming weeks therefore is probably a "war of attrition" that could even see the conflict lasting into 2023, albeit potentially at a lower fighting tempo.

The level and range of risks in Ukraine remain exceptionally high. This is partly because Moscow's "exit strategy" is not clear, and miscalculation is still a significant possibility. While the Russian military was ineffective to begin with, it now controls between 20-25 percent of Ukraine, and may hold much of this territory for years.

Moreover, it is now the announced strategy of the Western alliance led by the United States to try to inflict a defeat on Russia. In the history of NATO in the post-war era, this is a very important difference from before, and raises the stakes further in the months to come.

Historically, wars have tended to end in two ways: when one side imposes its will on the other on the battlefield, then at the negotiating table; or when both sides embrace a compromise they deem preferable to fighting. Unless something big changes, neither is likely in Ukraine imminently, especially as both sides are prepared to expend massive resources in the conflict.

Following Russian territorial wins in recent months, Ukraine is gathering a large fighting force equipped with western weapons to try to recapture some of its southern and eastern territory from Moscow which now controls territories in the nation which are the combined size of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ordered his military to particularly try to recover areas that are key to the country's economy. Meanwhile, Russia is preparing for the next stage of its offensive with its forces stepping up military operations in "all operational areas."

The economic impact of the war may be exacerbated by Russia cutting off more gas supplies, at least periodically, to increasing numbers of EU nations in coming months. That is why the bloc's energy ministers have agreed a controversial new plan to try to deliver voluntary cuts of 15 percent in gas use from next month to March 2023.

Pessimistic as this "war of attrition" scenario may seem, with the human cost ― including for millions of refugees ― largest of all, it is not the worst-case outcome. That future is most likely to be realized if the conflict escalates beyond Ukraine to involve NATO countries. While this still seems unlikely to many, it cannot be dismissed. Such is the volatility of the situation.

This would be a genuine catastrophe for many, and the use of nuclear or chemical weapons cannot be completely ruled out. Moreover, not only would the regime of sanctions and counter sanctions grow, there might also be wider economic collapse, expediting the impulse toward de-globalization.

Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.