Russia-Ukraine conflict presents a window of strategic opportunity for North Korea

By Lee Jong-eun

A year into his presidency, the U.S. Biden administration has yet to catch a break facing one global challenge after another. With the start of 2022, the United States confronts the escalation of military tensions between Ukraine and Russia.

Demanding NATO's agreement to ban Ukraine's NATO membership and limit NATO's deployment in Eastern Europe, Russia has recently massed its troops on the Russia-Ukraine border. In the hope of defusing the situation, the U.S. has been engaged in a series of negotiations with Russia, with Biden warning the latter would pay "a heavy price" if it invades Ukraine.

In East Asia, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), North Korea's official name, has also stepped up its pressure on the Biden administration. Since the start of the year, North Korea has conducted four short-range ballistic missile tests, including two hypersonic missile launches.

On Jan. 20, the DPRK leader Kim Jung-un reportedly instructed his officials to "examine the issue of restarting all temporarily suspended activities," referring to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear tests that the regime has placed a moratorium on since the spring of 2018. Should DPRK resume the tests, there is a possibility that the regime could cross the "red line" long warned by the U.S., testing MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) ICBMs that could simultaneously target multiple U.S. cities.

While condemning North Korea's latest provocations, the Biden administration faces strategic constraints in response. While the attention is on potential military confrontation with Russia, how much commitment could the U.S. make in also confronting DPRK? Would the U.S. risk two-front military confrontations?

Since the Cold War, a two-front war has been a prospect U.S. national strategists have always dreaded. In 2018, the U.S. National Security strategy replaced the two-war strategy with a focus on preparing for one major war, most likely with China. This signifies that the security situation is different from 2017 when U.S. President Trump could threaten "fire and fury" against "little rocket man" Kim.

Even if the DPRK crosses over the U.S. red line on ICBM tests, the Biden Administration will be confronted with a dilemma in deciding the bigger security threat: Russia's military operation or DPRK's nuclear tests. Whichever answer the Biden administration picks, the U.S. response could risk dividing the U.S. alliance between European and East Asian allies.

By threatening to place the U.S. in a strategic dilemma, the DPRK regime is, intentionally or unintentionally, using the strategic opportunity presented by the Russia-U.S. conflict over Ukraine. In signaling the prospect of resuming the ICBM and nuclear tests, potentially in spring, DPRK presents an ultimatum to the Biden administration on whether to negotiate with the former or ignore the challenge and risk a two-front security crisis in Europe and Northeast Asia. After a year of diplomatic stand-off, North Korea is challenging the U.S. for a response.

How might the U.S. respond to DPRK's challenge? From the DPRK's perspective, the best scenario would be if the Biden administration negotiates with the former to mitigate the regional security tensions. The Biden administration might consider temporally placating North Korea to focus on containing the more pressing threat from Russia.

After a year of rejecting the previous Trump administration's top-down approach, the Biden administration might be compelled to agree to high-level negotiations, even resumption of letter exchanges between the heads of state. Yielding from its stance of starting diplomatic talks without pre-conditions, the U.S. might concede to several of DPRK's demands, such as a moratorium on U.S.-ROK military exercises or even marginal sanction relief.

Another possible outcome would be that the Biden administration chose to be "strategically indifferent" toward DPRK's ultimatum. U.S. policymakers have concerns concessions to DPRK would project a political image of weakness for the Biden administration, domestically and internationally. In response to the DPRK's threat, the Biden administration might dare the latter to carry out its provocations, engaging in a game of bluffing.

Even under such an outcome, if the Russia-Ukraine conflict continues into the spring, the DPRK still has a window of opportunity; the U.S. would be constrained in its retaliatory actions against the former's provocations. During the Vietnam War, U.S. administrations were restrained in their responses toward DPRK provocations, such as the capturing of the USS Pueblo and the shooting down of a U.S. EC-121 aircraft.

This year, the DPRK could use the window to continue its missile and nuclear tests and further cement its de facto nuclear power status. With the expansion of new technology and arsenal, the DPRK's bargaining leverage will increase at future arms control talks. Using the present Russia-Ukraine conflict as an opportune timeframe to risk ICBM and nuclear tests, while US retaliatory capacity is constrained, the regime could potentially achieve a state of "irreversible nuclearization."

The DPRK regime should, however, maintain a strategic caution and consider the period after the window closes. What will happen after the U.S. manages to contain the Russia-Ukraine conflict? Will the US return to confront North Korea for taking advantage of the former's strategic distractions? The DPRK might also consider the lesson from Japan's overreach during the Pacific War.

In the early period of its military expansion, the Japanese Empire avoided rigorous deterrence from the U.S., which was more focused on Europe's conflict. However, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor provoked the U.S. to engage in a two-front war, which the latter would have been reluctant to fight in a different circumstance. In planning its strategic challenge against the U.S., the DPRK should first calculate how long the U.S. could be tied down by Russia; second, avoid an overreach that would enrage the "bald eagle" to engage in a two-front war in both Asia and Europe.

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate and is also an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.