How Ukraine crisis could derail US-China strategic competition

By Lee Jong-eun

Multiple international analysts have predicted that the Asia-Pacific region will be the likely location of a "new Cold War." With the rise of China, policy experts have applied theoretical concepts such as the "Thucydides Trap" to warn of the inevitable strategic rivalry between existing and rising superpowers, the United States and China.

Such predictions have shown signs of materializing from the foreign policies of the two superpowers in recent years. While China has started to assert its regional influence over the South China Sea, the U.S. has also elevated the strategic importance of Asia-Pacific. Proclaiming to defend a "free and open Indo-Pacific," the U.S. has expanded strategic partnerships within the region through institutions such as the Quad and AUKUS, comprising the U.S. and its major allies such as the United Kingdom, Japan and Australia.

Under the current Biden administration, the U.S. has become vocal in criticizing China's domestic policies related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong, even declining to send a diplomatic delegation to this year's Beijing Winter Olympics. In response, China has criticized the U.S. attempts to contain its rise and has redoubled efforts to achieve self-reliance in high-tech industries. Taiwan, in particular, has received attention as a likely location for strategic confrontation between China and the U.S.

Then last week, U.S. foreign policy experienced a "geopolitical earthquake." After months of heightened tensions, Russia launched military operations in Ukraine. Declaring Russia's aggression will be met with severe consequences, the Biden administration is collaborating with European allies to impose strict sanctions on Russia. However, with Russia appearing determined to withstand international sanctions to achieve its strategic objectives, the Ukraine crisis could become a prolonged conflict in Europe.

For China, it would not be the first time in this century to experience an unexpected shift in U.S. strategic focus. In 2001, the Bush Administration was planning a foreign policy that is more assertive toward China. As a presidential candidate, Bush had described China as a "strategic competitor" and promised to be "tough and firm" in honoring the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan from China's threat. In its first year, the Bush Administration approved the largest arms sale to Taiwan since 1992; and the Pentagon began drafting a new Quadrennial Defense Review Report, which treated China as a "potential threat and outlined measures of response."

However, the 9/11 terror attacks reoriented U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. For the next two decades, the U.S. administrations would be entrapped fighting the "War on Terror," which ended last year with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, "pivot to Asia" was stalled for at least 15-20 years, a timeframe in which China emerged as the second greatest superpower.

The crisis in Europe presents another opportunity for China to divert U.S. strategic pressures toward another actor. First, despite controversies, China's foreign policy now appears more prudent than the militancy of another revisionist power, Russia. So long as China refrains from overt military aggression toward Taiwan, China's image can improve as a relatively more responsible state actor.

Second, China's economic contributions will become even more important for the global economy. Despite China's tacit alignment with Russia, the Biden administration will likely be reluctant to advocate mutual sanctions against Russia and China; such measures could have severe consequences for the global economy. As the U.S. encourages the international community to collaborate in sanctions against Russia, maintaining stable economic ties with China will be critical in mitigating damage to the global economy.

Third, China's neutrality is crucial in the new round of the U.S.-Russia conflict. Even if it is unrealistic to expect China to renounce its alignment with Russia or participate in international sanctions, the U.S. will request that China minimize assistance to Russia. U.S. policymakers might fear antagonizing China could motivate it to more actively side with Russia, supporting Russia's military operations in Ukraine.

How might China take advantage of the present U.S.-Russia conflict? China appears to be engaging in a "buck-passing strategy," tacitly endorsing Russia's stance on Ukraine but without pledging specific assistance. Chinese officials have refused to characterize Russia's military operations as an "invasion" and have opposed sanctions. However, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson also suggested "Russia as a powerful nation also does not need China or other countries to provide (military assistance)," implying China's intention for minimal involvement.

China had displayed similar strategic behavior during the Iraq War. In taking a low-key opposition stance to the war, China "buck-passed" to France and Germany, active resistance to U.S. foreign policy, evading the wrath of the Bush administration.

The Russia-Ukraine war does pose a strategic danger for China. If Russia is defeated too quickly in Ukraine, China might regret its strategy of passing the buck. The victorious U.S. would then pivot again to Asia with renewed confidence and assertiveness. However, if China is perceived as an active ally of Russia, the cost of the new cold war could spill over to China as well. In determining the level of their involvement, Chinese policymakers will carefully observe Russia's ability to confront the U.S. unilaterally.

For China, an optimal strategic outcome would be "hun shui mo yu" (to fish in troubled water). While U.S. strategic resources and attention are tied in Europe, China could consolidate its regional hegemony, though avoiding an overreach that could provoke the U.S.' two-front cold war. After resolving the crisis with Russia, U.S. policymakers might view China as having risen too high to contain and be forced to consider a grand strategic bargain.

Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu) is a Ph.D. candidate and is also an adjunct faculty at the American University School of International Service. Prior to this, he has served as a South Korean Airforce intelligence officer. His research specialty includes U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management, East Asian regional security.