South Korea as global pivot state

By Sean O'Malley

During a recent, surprise visit to Ukraine, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged $5.5 billion in aid to the country while clearly stating Japan resolutely rejects Russian aggression and fully supports Kyiv. His visit coincided with Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting Moscow for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, providing a stark contrast of values between a democratic belief in the international rule of law and authoritarian revisionism. He then invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the G7 summit he will host this May in Japan. The optics could not have been clearer: Japan intends to play a significant role in opposing global revisionism.

Having been accused of "checkbook diplomacy" in the past, an ignoble phrase demeaning Japan as a global free-rider in times of conflict, Kishida's government has supported Ukraine from the beginning by joining Western sanctions on Russia immediately and pledging billions of dollars in aid last year. Additionally, the country's parliament voted to double defense expenditures from one to two percent of GDP in part to increase its regional position against the revisionist states of China and Russia.

Relevance in global political influence is not a trait intrinsic to developed status. Political influence is earned by using one's economic, military or cultural power to foster change in the international system. A state's relevance increases as it earns respect from other states through its political will to exercise its power, time and again, in the cause of fostering change.

Having aligned its values, money and actions to counter revisionist threats to global order, Japan is making itself more relevant. It is acting like a "global pivot state."

Somewhat ironically, it is the South Korean administration of President Yoon that most recently advanced the concept of a global pivot state by self-anointing South Korea thusly. The Yoon administration believes a global pivot state promotes peace, prosperity and universal values. Moreover, this newly evolved concept implies that a global pivot state is the nucleus of a certain global activity or tips the scales to favor a principled direction in global policy. Yet, in contrast to Japan, South Korea seems a laggard in such regard.

From the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, South Korea's material interests have been a priority for successive administrations. When Western sanctions-hit Russia, the former South Korean administration of Moon Jae-in wavered, reportedly worried that supporting sanctions would harm Seoul's corporate interests in Russia. For his part, President Yoon Suk Yeol secured a major Korean arms sales deal to Poland, estimated to be worth $17 billion-$20 billion, while refusing to sell to Ukraine, the victim of an illegal war of aggression. Seoul's position on arms sales to Ukraine caused the Ukrainian ambassador to South Korea to quip, "Sitting on the fence and pretending to be neutral does not help either the one who chooses such a 'path' or the cause of peace as a whole."

Compared to Japan and other major economies, Seoul's contributions in aid to Ukraine have been meager. South Korea has pledged $230 million a mere four percent of Japan's pledged aid. Arguably, the highest-ranking Korean visitor to Ukraine is the ousted former chief of the ruling party, Lee Jun-seok, who was accompanied by a small group of legislators, while Japan sent Prime Minister Kishida. Shamefully, when Ukrainian President Zelenskyy virtually addressed South Korea's lawmakers at the National Assembly, only 60 of 300 lawmakers reportedly attended, with some spending time on their smartphones.

It is said that news of the Ukraine conflict is still prevalent in Japan and often discussed. Prime Minister Kishida reportedly felt domestic political pressure to visit the country. This is hardly the case in Korea, where Ukraine barely warrants a place in the news. South Korean political elites and the public seem consumed by talk of political vendettas, historical grievances with Japan and domestic economic challenges.

South Korea enjoys a top ten economic ranking and a top six military power ranking, the latter of which is higher than Japan and just shy of the United Kingdom. Korean conglomerates, cultural contents and military arms sales enjoy an increasing global presence. So why does it feel as though South Korea is verging on irrelevance in global political influence?

Self-anointing the status of a global pivot state does not make it so. Nor does an increasing corporate or cultural contents presence assure such status. Rather, it is necessary to put forth well-crafted and selfless leadership actions in confronting the world's most complex problems. Unfortunately, South Korea has been virtually non-existent, as a participant or a leader, when it comes to the crisis in Ukraine.

A global pivot state can be seen as an influencer in world affairs as well. Although Seoul often talks of promoting universal norms in world affairs, it continues to stay on the periphery as a mostly passive observer of the world's most complex issues. Focused mainly on the health of its own economy, the country takes few risks in foreign affairs and gives so little in total foreign aid that accusing it of checkbook diplomacy would be difficult.

While South Korea scrambles to further financial interests and pretends to be neutral, Japan is clearly signaling its intentions to block global efforts at revisionism while supporting Ukrainians. It is signaling these intentions by aligning its values, money and actions to put more pressure on Moscow and Beijing. These are the actions of a global pivot state.

Is South Korea's global political relevance currently in decline? The question may seem counterintuitive with an increasing global presence of corporate and cultural contents. However, global pivot states should be activists that push great powers to do better. They can do this by joining coalitions to induce behavioral change. At this time, South Korea's interests appear too parochial and materialistic to act as a global pivot state. If it does not align its professed values, money, and actions more proactively, I fear it may find itself irrelevant in future affairs.

Sean O'Malley (seanmo@dongseo.ac.kr) is a tenured professor of international studies at Dongseo University, where he teaches classes on U.S.-Korea Relations, the European Union and regionalism. His most recent paper, "Nationalism as a Primary Institution in Northeast Asia" can be found in Asia Review.