Why a smarter campaign on terror is key, 20 years on

By Andrew Hammond

As the 20th anniversary of 9/11 has just passed, Joe Biden has declared that U.S.-led anti-terror efforts must continue following the end of the war in Afghanistan, but Washington would be wise to deploy a much smarter campaign going forward.

There is now a window of opportunity for this campaign to be created, with the president's major speech Aug. 31, in which he declared that the exit to the war in Afghanistan ends "an era of major U.S military operations to remake other countries."

Despite the mistakes made in the U.S. withdrawal, as well as during the prior negotiations with the Taliban in Doha, under the Biden and Trump administrations, there is no question that the heavy post 9/11 U.S. military presence in not just Afghanistan, but also in other nations like Iraq, antagonized many across the world, especially in Muslim-majority countries.

This previous 20 years of U.S. military presence is one factor that has continued to drive the pockets of very high anti-Americanism in some Muslim-majority states, which also pre-dated the presidencies of both Biden and Donald Trump. These countries include Turkey, Jordan and Pakistan, where opinion polls show that positive sentiment toward the United States has fallen off a cliff in the last two decades.

In this context, it is increasingly clear that there has been a key weakness in the U.S. approach to the global "campaign on terrorism." That is, the response has been hyper-militarized ― dominated by counter terrorism and security ― while other soft power instruments, such as foreign aid, have been underinvested in.

To be sure, even this unbalanced strategy has secured some key successes, and the U.S. homeland has not been hit again in such a spectacular way by terrorists for twenty years. Yet, an overwhelming emphasis on hard power has fueled significant controversy, alienating many across the world.

This hard power approach was lauded by Donald Trump during his presidency. He regularly claimed that one of the triumphs of his term of office was, for instance, "carpet bombing … into oblivion" the so-called Islamic State, despite the fact that the terror group and its offshoots continue to operate around the world, including in Afghanistan.

Biden would do well to reflect on this imbalance, and his period as vice-president in Barack Obama's administration, when these issues where last seriously debated. At that time, senior U.S. policymakers highlighted the need for a paradigm shift, which might well have come to fruition in a Hillary Clinton presidency, inasmuch as she had championed a policy of "smart power:" re-orientating the balance between hard and soft power in favor of the latter.

The reason that these issues are so important is that the continuing anti-terrorism contest is, in essence, one in which the outcome is related to a battle between moderates and extremists within Islamic societies. And unless this power struggle is better recognized and addressed, with the soft power elements of the campaign on terrorism dialed up significantly, the U.S.-led international strategy will continue to face serious setbacks.

The soft power roadmap for what is needed is relatively clear. Seizing the moment requires the United States and international partners to give much higher priority to activities such as public diplomacy, sustainable development, economic assistance and exchange programs.

One of the potential manifestations of such a soft power strategy is the extra weight the Biden team is seeking to give U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). From its creation in the early 1960s, this international agency has steadily lost influence within the U.S. government and control over its own agenda and budget. Moreover, while Trump frequently boasted about U.S. generosity, he repeatedly tried to cut foreign aid spending, with his efforts largely blocked by Congress, and Biden must now reverse this outlook.

For, as Biden has rightly noted, building soft power is an expensive, demanding and complex generational project, and one that the government cannot achieve alone. Hence the reason why non-governmental players from the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and faith communities are also key for success.

It is the Cold War that perhaps provides the best comparison with what may now needed in the campaign against terrorism. Just like the U.S. struggle with the Soviet Union, which was ultimately won by U.S.-led international containment, cultural vigor and strategic patience, the challenges posed by the campaign against terrorism need a much smarter balance between hard and soft power, with resources to match.

Numerous U.S. officials have highlighted the gross mismatch between the current budgets of the Pentagon and other U.S. international programs. Today, for instance, Washington spends about 500 times more on its military than it does collectively on international broadcasting and exchanges, which proved so successful during the Cold War.

Of course, a holistic international plan to tackle violent extremism will inevitably have a military and counter-terrorism component. However, soft power needs to become a much bigger part of the overall mix.

Following the U.S.'s withdrawal from Afghanistan, Biden must now address this weakness in the campaign against terrorism. Moreover, he must also build bipartisan support for a sustained commitment during the presidencies beyond, too, in what must be a generational commitment to maximize the prospects for success.

Andrew Hammond (andrewkorea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.