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"China can do more, and it should," said Tina Stege, climate ambassador for the Marshall Islands, which could submerge underneath the rising Pacific Ocean. These comments were underscored by Alf Wills, a former chief COP negotiator for South Africa, who said that other developing nations were loath to publicly criticize Beijing on this issue given that Chinese diplomats can be instrumental in delivering funding for them.
Yet, it is the United States that has been most forceful in its critique with President Joe Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, asserting that the Chinese are "significant outliers" among countries that have made commitments in an attempt to limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, as agreed in Paris in 2015. He asserted that Beijing had "an obligation to step up to greater ambition as we go forward" and that China is "a big country with a lot of resources and a lot of capabilities" which is "perfectly capable of living up to their responsibilities."
While Sullivan's critique needs to be seen in the context of the current tensions in U.S.-China relations, the fact that other countries share at least some of his sentiment risks exacerbating the soft power challenges that Beijing already faces which has the potential to become a growing headache for the ruling Communist Party in the 2020s.
China cares deeply about its international image and, according to David Shambaugh, a leading sinologist at George Washington University, the nation is expected to spend some $10 billion a year as part of a soft power campaign.
COP26 aside, a significant driver of China's soft power problems is, ironically, its very success in rapidly becoming a nascent superpower. Indeed, the nation's rise to greater prominence has been one of the defining features of the post-Cold War period, and this has been reinforced by major trade and diplomatic initiatives such as the Belt and Road initiative.
Take the example of Beijing's growing economic power. International Monetary Fund (IMF) data since 2014 has asserted that the nation's economy is now larger than its U.S. counterpart on a purchasing power parity basis which adjusts for the fact that goods are cheaper in China and other countries relative to the U.S.
However, the consequences of the country's generally strong growth in recent decades have been more than economic. In terms of perceptions, many internationally believe the global balance of power has swung very significantly.
Pew Global Research has highlighted this stark change in international perceptions toward Beijing. A significant number of nations in its surveys now assert that China is the world's "leading economic power."
Much of the reason for these changed perceptions of China's strength stem from the aftermath of the 2008-09 financial crisis. While much of the developed world subsequently recovered, at a sometimes slow pace, from the worst economic downturn for a generation, China has enjoyed mostly strong growth.
While welcomed by many in China who understandably like recognition of the country's growing might, this opinion shift is not without headaches for Beijing. For it has exposed the country to greater foreign scrutiny and fed into perceptions, seized upon by politicians, tapping into concern about China's rise.
The significantly brighter spotlight on the country, especially since 2008, has exposed a deficit of soft power which is complicating its rise to power. Soft power is recognized by Beijing as a key political commodity, but one it has had limited success in cultivating to date.
As international perceptions of the country's power have changed, its global favorability has shown weakness in multiple key countries, as underlined in Pew Research Center. And this has been exacerbated by the pandemic.
According to a survey conducted by Pew in 14 different countries, a median of 61 percent of respondents say China has done a bad job in dealing with the coronavirus outbreak. Confidence in Xi also fell in surveyed countries with the poll showing a median of 78 percent of those surveyed have little or no confidence in the leader.
Especially if critical scrutiny intensifies, Beijing must find better ways to tackle this soft-power deficit. This includes enhanced international public diplomacy to win more foreign "hearts and minds."
Beijing should also restart the process of addressing foreign concerns about its intentions as a rising power. Here, it could intensify efforts to be seen as a responsible, peaceful global stakeholder. And match this rhetoric with actions.
In the post-pandemic period ahead of us, this agenda will pose significant challenges. However, unless it is tackled, the nation's soft power deficit will only grow bigger in the 2020s.
Andrew Hammond (Andrew.korea@outlook.com) is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.