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By Lee Jong-eun
Throughout its history, Korea has faced geopolitical challenges from regional neighbors. Korea's past rulers have struggled to protect the nation's sovereignty amid regional geopolitical conflicts. Though some rulers have succeeded, others have failed, resulting in severe consequences for the peninsula and its people.
Today, the South Korean government also faces geopolitical challenges on four fronts. The first challenge is deterring nuclear threats from North Korea. The second challenge is resolving disputes with Japan over historical grievances. The third challenge is navigating U.S.-China geopolitical tensions, particularly in the Taiwan Strait. The fourth challenge is determining the level of South Korea's involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war.
Each of these challenges could threaten South Korea's present and future geopolitical security. For risk management, a series of South Korean governments have aspired to maintain balanced diplomacy toward regional neighbors. For example, though supporting U.S. regional strategy for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, South Korea has refrained from regional security involvement that could antagonize China, such as joining the Quad. In the Russia-Ukraine War, though participating in international economic sanctions against Russia, South Korea has refrained from sending military aid directly to Ukraine.
The current South Korean government, led by President Yoon Suk Yeol, faces elevated pressures in maintaining the geopolitical balance. While the U.S. requests South Korea's more proactive role as a member of the alliance of democracies, Russia and China have warned South Korea not to intervene in regional crises outside the Korean Peninsula. Yoon's government's policy choices in response to these competing pressures could have long-lasting geopolitical consequences for South Korea.
In international diplomacy, compromises will inevitably be made. Due to changing geopolitical circumstances, a country might shift its alignment closer toward one regional power over the other. However, to quote South Korea's Foreign Minister Park Jin, if diplomacy is like "filling a cup half-full with water, and expecting the other country to fill the rest," then South Korea might at times consider engaging in a "hard bargain" to ensure other states respect South Korea's fair share in diplomatic compromise and cooperation.
Yoon's government is committed to a closer strategic partnership with the U.S. and Japan, despite the risks of strategic conflicts with North Korea, China and Russia. Through engaging in a hard bargain, however, Yoon's government could achieve compensation for South Korea's risks and ensure South Korea's diplomatic red lines are uncrossed.
Should South Korea align with the U.S. on economic policies toward China, such as decoupling in high-tech sectors, Yoon's government could bargain hard for the Biden administration to reassure the protection of South Korean business interests in the U.S. market. Specifically, protecting South Korean exports from the impact of the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS and Science Act could be fair compensation South Korea could demand in return for risking economic losses from trade with China.
Should South Korea set aside historical grievances with Japan to pursue a greater trilateral security partnership, Yoon's government could bargain hard for Japan's restraint of policies and rhetoric that provoke South Korea's domestic politics. Specifically, restraints in formal visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and contestation of South Korea's sovereignty over the Dokdo islets are concessions Yoon's government could pressure Japan as necessary for future-oriented bilateral relations.
Every country has a red line in its diplomatic commitment. South Korea, too is justified in balancing regional and global security commitments with pragmatic limits. While to critics, such bargaining may appear as opportunistic hedging, South Korea, like any other country, is justified in negotiating a balance between the risks of security isolation and entrapment. Just as the U.S. has exercised restraint in directly deploying troops to Ukraine, South Korea should negotiate the appropriate level and transparency of its security support for Ukraine. Though Taiwan's security is important to international security, preventing a crisis escalation in the Taiwan Strait is also a vital security issue for South Korea and other regional states.
One concern policymakers have about using hard bargaining is that it could cause strains in diplomatic relations. A softer, more congenial bargaining based on mutual trust and goodwill is an alternative approach to foster cooperation among states, especially among allies. Even within an alliance, however, there might be times when an ally has to nudge another ally to persuade it to make concessions. Hard bargaining signals the demands the bargainer prioritizes and challenges the other allies to address them as necessary for cooperation and unity. As Yoon's government responds to multiple geopolitical pressures, situations might arise where to attain reassurance for risky policy decisions, South Korea must bargain hard for reciprocal commitments from the U.S. and Japan.
But could a middle power like South Korea succeed in hard bargaining? As this year marks the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-Korea alliance, I note that South Korea's former President Syngman Rhee engaged in hard bargaining to achieve the mutual defense treaty in exchange for South Korea's compliance with the Korean Armistice Agreement. I also note that growing support within South Korea's domestic politics for independent nuclear armament has nudged U.S. policymakers to strengthen their reassurances for extended nuclear deterrence. Last week, the U.S.-Korea summit announced the establishment of a bilateral Nuclear Consultation Group (NCG) and the deployment of U.S. nuclear submarines to South Korea.
Similar to other diplomatic tactics, hard bargaining should be used with prudence. It could cause diplomatic contentions and might not achieve all of South Korea's objectives. However, as Yoon's government strives to transform South Korea into a global pivot state, I hope South Korea will master the art of both soft and hard diplomacy in pivoting the geopolitical challenges closer toward South Korea's own security interests.
Lee Jong-eun (jl4375a@student.american.edu), a Ph.D. candidate, is an adjunct faculty member at the American University School of International Service. His research specialties include U.S. foreign policy, South Korean politics and foreign policy, alliance management and East Asian regional security.